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A NATIONAL STRATEGY OF THE COLD WAR
FOR THE UNITED STATES

This paper is a sequel to one prepared for the National War College in January, 1951, on "A National Strategy for the Soviet Union." That War College paper sets forth the reasons for believing that unless the West itself initiates a war, which would be devastating to both sides, or permits itself to fall into a combination of military, political, and economic weakness which would invite war, we are very apt to be confronted for many, many years with the same sort of dangerous, uneasy world in which we now live. No one should draw from that paper the sweeping conclusion that war is definitely not imminent, nor relax their efforts to build up Western strength. It was intended to call attention to a probability which does not exclude the real possibility that its appraisal may be wrong. It was basically a plea for a confession of ignorance as regards both the future and our firm intelligence on the Soviet Union, and for a greater flexibility in outlook and planning which would include a valid conception of enemy intentions which, for many reasons, has not been given the attention which it seems to merit. We habitually tend to

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violate the principles which we have been taught and to commit ourselves to action based on what we consider the enemy will probably do. It seems as wrong to base our planning largely on the assumption that he will choose a global war in the near future as on the assumption that he will not, and very little long-range planning has been based on the latter.

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The current buildup of U.S. strength is intended to place us in a better position if a general war should break out, and, as its embodiment progresses, to provide an increasingly effective deterrent to the outbreak of general war. It should also be increasingly effective in deterring minor wars such as the Korean one. Two or three years from now, when the buildup is fully achieved, the deterrent effect should be a maximum. If the buildup achieves its purpose as a deterrent, the result during the ensuing few years will be either a maintaining of the status quo, or an armament race, necessitating further buildup of U.S. or Western strength, or the forcing of significant concessions from the USSR which will lessen the tensions and eventually permit reductions in our own military strength. The cost of either an armament race or of maintaining the steady

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pressure of the forces contemplated in the current buildup is so great as to be probably unacceptable over a long period of time.

It is believed that the United States intends in some way to attempt to force concessions from the USSR by means of our position of strength. As brought out in the previous paper, the characteristics of the Bolshevik party which controls the USSR are known to be such that they will not just sit down at a conference table and negotiate because the West is strong, unless they do so for purposes of deception. It is to be hoped that the United States will be well aware of the possibilities of deception, and will consistently take such stands that those possibilities are obviated. If this is done, it means that any significant concessions must be genuinely forced.

Complete economic blockade might be one way of exerting this force. The obstacles to the effectiveness of economic blockade are obvious from a consideration of the history of our export controls. Moreover, the effects of blockade against such a self-contained country as the Soviet Union are largely in the technological field. They are slow in the results obtained, and by the time we are able to overcome

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all the obstacles, it may require too many years for them to exert their desired effect.

The only other obvious way of actually exerting force is by the actual and specific threat of war on the part of the United States, with every intention of implementing the threat if a stipulated concession is not made, and with the USSR fully believing that we intend to make that implementation. This would probably be effective. On the other hand, it might result in the United States precipitating a war for which it was more or less prepared, for there are many concessions, including those of ultimate power, to which the Soviet Union would not yield but would rather accept war. The implications of the United States itself precipitating a war in which its own people would be involved are complex, but there seems to be general agreement that such an act would be undesirable if a solution to the problems could be found in any other way.

We thus seem to be forced back upon war or the genuine willingness to precipitate war as the only realistic means at our own disposal of putting an end to the cold war within any acceptable period of time. We cannot afford to wait, like Mr. Micawber, until "something turns up"--until the

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Bolsheviks themselves realize the error of their ways, or evolve into something that is not Bolshevism; nor do we desire to accept a sharp and clear-cut alternative of war as a means of exerting real pressure on the Bolsheviks.

There are good reasons for the situation in which we find ourselves as regards long-range planning for the cold war. We are suddenly confronted with new conceptions and new techniques in international affairs that have been developed by others than ourselves and with which we have had no experience. Our governmental organization is an outgrowth of a different sort of experience, and it will take a conscious effort for us to adapt it to these new conditions. Our military establishment is probably the most experienced and powerful planning organization which we have, deriving its strength from the realism and validity of the elements with which it deals. It knows very accurately how many divisions, warships, or air groups it will have at its disposal at a given time, and the planning processes are consequently vastly simplified. Due to its historical development, however, its very existence is premised on combat of U.S. forces, and as an organization it is geared only to planning for and preparing for such combat, regardless of whether or not its strength is a deterrent or a precipitant

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of war. The Korean affair has shown that whether or not formal war plans exist, our military establishment is adapted to situations involving combat of U.S. forces on any scale. NATO is essentially a defense organization, and is also peculiarly adapted only to planning and preparing for general war.

At first glance, we do not seem to have an organization which can plan operations in the cold war in the same sense that we are set up to do conventional war planning. The State Department has large responsibilities here, and the nature of its planning is inherently different from that of the military. It deals with elements that are much less tangible than firm force tabs, and it is just as unwilling to hamper its freedom of action by political commitments as the military is by military commitments. Moreover, the cold war is waged on a front that disregards our present governmental compartmentations. If we consider the way in which the Soviet Union wages the cold war, it becomes very clear that it involves a synthesized effort which transcends any of our major Departments, embracing diplomatic and political maneuvers, a wide range of economic measures, psychological warfare in the sense of propaganda both gray and

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black as well as white and also in the sense of action and threat of action other than propaganda, the whole gamut of covert activities ranging from espionage, sabotage, and subversion to guerrilla warfare and Resistance movements, the use of overt satellite armies, limited actual use and threat of use of the Red Army, and the "war of nerves" generally. Since the great weight of almost all of our conventional organizations is either living from hand to mouth combatting emergencies or is put to work on the assumption that there will be war, it is extremely difficult to get anyone to give serious consideration now to our course of action if war does not come. There have consequently been various proposals for some sort of "General Staff" to plan and guide the cold war.

At this point it seems desirable to point out the distinction between concepts on a national level and planning. A "General Staff" is less concerned with the generation of broad national concepts than with the preparation of plans to carry out such conceptions. What might be called the national strategic conception, on which General Staff plans are based, involves broad national elements that go beyond the direct force tabs involved, and which have economic and political implications of the greatest importance. National

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strategic conceptions are seldom if ever generated by groups, committees, or organizations set up for that purpose, nor do they need to be. They are more in the nature of a synthesis and crystallization of judgment regarding various possible courses of action which may arise in the minds of various groups and individuals, and the ultimate selection is usually done by the heads of governments or by personalities at the highest level. Such conceptions may or may not lend themselves to staff criticism, and they must be fitted in with other competing conceptions and commitments. The basic Allied strategic conception of the last war which gave priority to Europe was largely the work of Churchill, who of course required the support of the War Cabinet and of Roosevelt and his advisors to implement it. The main point involved here is that when conceptions become sufficiently broad they are not usually presented by an organization as a choice of broad alternatives, but involve rather the criteria by which proposals from organizations are judged and decided, and so eventually constitute the guidelines by which planning action is initiated.

If a strategic conception for the cold war were clearly formulated and tentatively accepted, it would provide a point of departure from which our existing organizations could

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undertake the planning and operations which would embody the conception. Just as in hot war planning, the planning processes and feasibility tests might prove the conception to be faulty or too full of risk. If so, the conception would have to be altered. In the case of hot war, we have an additional point of departure in D-day--the assumption that war will break out. The cold war has already broken out, and we tend to be confused in our planning processes by the loss of this fixed point of departure in Time, and such planning as we do is apt to be from hand to mouth for this reason as well as due to the lack of accepted strategic conceptions. The lack of a D-day for the cold war also entangles operations with planning and preparing. With a D-day in the future, even if its actual date is under enemy control, normal preparations permit the results to unfold according to plan if only the plan is well-enough done and if a reasonable time has been available for the preparations. When D-day has passed us by with only fragmentary plans, we are caught in the tangle of urgent operations with no orientation in Time to retrieve the situation.

The approval by the President of NSC 10/2 was a basic step in our ability to wage the cold war. Because of "the vicious covert activities of the USSR, its satellite countries

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and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims of the United States and other Western powers," the Office of Policy Coordination was created within the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and conduct covert operations in time of peace to supplement the overt foreign activities of the U.S. Government in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security. Subject only to the requirement that the responsibility of the U.S. Government be not shown, or if shown, can be plausibly denied, and subject to ensuring that operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies and with overt activities, we have already adopted a whole arsenal of cold war potentialities, including any covert activities related to propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage, demolition, subversion against hostile states, and assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups. The intent seems clearly to be that of using the Soviet techniques ourselves in so far as they are adaptable to our use. There are obviously many limitations to our ability to use Soviet techniques and even to our will to do so, but when we consider the heart of the problem, which is the breaking of the hold of the Bolshevik power over the USSR and the Iron Curtain countries—and the war, in either hot or cold form, will continue until that is done or the Bolsheviks cease to be

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Bolsheviks--it seems clear that the only ~~weapon~~ short of war or the genuine threat of war which has any real chance of being decisive in the cold war within a reasonable time is that of the undergrounds and Resistance movements in Communist countries, backed up and supported by the other techniques, both overt and covert. There is a regrettable tendency to believe that even in war all America has to do is to announce that we are friends of the peoples of Russia and her satellites and not of their masters in order to unleash rebellion. It is far from being that simple, for the peoples concerned are often as suspicious of us as of their masters, and the logistics of support and the organization of communications and leadership are fundamental additions to the difficult problems of finding communities of interest and ways of exerting control.

There are no countries not under Communist control whose armies we could deliberately use to fight our wars on a planned basis in the fashion that the Soviet Union uses its satellites. The solution of actual Revolution in Communist countries, covertly fostered and supported by ourselves, is closely akin to this, however, and seems to make maximum utilization of a major weakness which is inherent in the Communist regime itself. The methods which

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that regime has found necessary in order to retain its control over its peoples have resulted in much discontent and unhappiness among these peoples. Attempts have been made to estimate the extent of actual and potential disaffection that exists, but from the very nature of the problem, it is impossible to reach any quantitative conclusions which would be generally accepted. There is only continuing evidence which shows clearly that this disaffection is an important factor, and that the police-state methods which help to foster it are very effective in controlling it. There is at present rather general agreement, at least among West-
 erners, that nothing can be done about it until these controls are broken or materially weakened. There is a general belief that the stresses of war might break those controls, but that the peoples themselves of the European Communist countries can do very little about it in the absence of external war. The ultimate effectiveness of Resistance movements, other than as an adjunct to war, is heavily discounted on the grounds that as soon as Resistance raises its head, it would be savagely repressed, if necessary by the Red Army itself.

This appraisal of the effectiveness of Resistance movements behind the Iron Curtain is, however, made for

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present conditions and in the absence of any general strategic conception of the cold war. It is premised upon uncoordinated uprisings, or, at best, upon coordinated action in single countries. There is a peculiarity of resistance movements and undergrounds which also is reflected in this appraisal, and which is recognized as a severe limitation on the building up of undergrounds for use in a war whose D-day is unknown to us. The most difficult thing for any covert organization to do is to remain completely dormant. As it begins to gather strength, there is an increasing tendency to act, particularly when politically motivated, and its actions invite reprisals and suppression. For this reason, the most that probably can be done in the preparation of undergrounds for a war of unknown date is the placing or locating of key organizing personnel sufficiently small in number to insure that they can be relied on to remain inactive even in their work of organizing until the time is ripe, which means when the date of the outbreak of war is known to us with reasonable certainty.

For cold war purposes, this difficulty could conceivably be solved only if we ourselves could establish a date for action. If we could establish such a date, effective simultaneously throughout all of the Iron Curtain

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countries, we would have gone far towards removing the remaining pessimism which has been expressed towards the fostering of Resistance movements in peacetime. The Red Army could certainly concentrate in suppressing uprisings in a single country, but simultaneous uprisings throughout the Communist world would make such concentration impossible. Moreover, if the scale of the project were sufficiently broad as to constitute a genuine Revolutionary effort, the experience of the Germans in the early days of the last war, backed up by some current intelligence, indicates the possibility of significant defections from the Red Army itself. Such a conception would restore to us a D-day for major action in the cold war, and would give coherence and centralization of concept to our planning analogous to that of hot war planning. This D-day would necessarily be far enough in the future for us to have fully developed our military strength, and the role of the military as an organization would not only be one of covert logistic support for the uprisings, but one of disposition and preparation with a view to ultimate overt intervention if that should serve our own ultimate interests.

The time required to prepare such undergrounds on the necessary scale and with the necessary geographic distribution

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is considerable, extending into years. It is even very doubtful if this country has the necessary skill and knowledge to bring such a project to fruition. That, however, is something that we will never know positively until we consider it seriously. Already I believe we can say that we know how to go about it in the satellites, and we have even a tenuous foothold in Lithuania and the Ukraine, with further footholds scheduled in the fairly near future for the Caucasus and eastern Siberia. Southwestern Siberia seems possible, but the Great Russian homeland is almost a complete unknown. Although it seems held largely by force, opinion on possibilities there is divided. Although the informer system is so highly developed in Russia proper as to constitute a formidable obstacle to the organization of a genuine underground, it may be possible to gain more or less isolated footholds there which can be supported from outside. The only way we shall ever know is when we send a controlled Russian in and hear from him again, for in this respect Russia proper is still an enigma which only Russians can answer. Even if we can never succeed in that much as regards the Great Russian lands, there appear to be real possibilities in all other areas.

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Organizing and supporting Revolution simultaneously in many enemy-held lands is full of difficulties, and the paucity of our intelligence makes its practicability peculiarly difficult to appraise. It would be a serious and damaging thing for us to bring rebellion into existence without a reasonable chance of success, and thereby not only be guilty of irresponsibility, but squander the assets which we might have built up behind the Iron Curtain. Since our intelligence has hitherto been only incidentally pointed in this direction, it should be possible to provide some relief in this respect within a reasonable period of time.

Another major difficulty is the mutually exclusive conceptions of power and control in a liberated Russia which are held by various emigre groups, particularly between the Great Russians and the national minorities of the Soviet Union. It is important that these difficulties do not appear to exist appreciably as between Soviet and satellite groups, and as regards the Soviet Union, our national policy is already fairly well formulated. It would seem that the best way for us to handle this problem would be to put our cards on the table to all groups, making

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it clear that we will do no more than provide a framework within which the Russians themselves can settle such differences, and that we will support any group which will be effective in disintegrating the Bolshevik power provided only that it does not work against other groups until after the disintegration has occurred. Implementing such a policy in the face of the difficulties which will be deliberately created by many elements will be a great problem, but it does not appear to be a completely insoluble one.

The most encouraging aspect about it is the evidence that it seems to be a phenomenon that is largely peculiar to those who have already been liberated. I believe that the disaffected Great Russians within Russia are principally concerned with breaking Bolshevism, and therefore more amenable to supporting such a policy than the emigres. This is less true of the more powerful national minorities, still in their homelands, particularly the Ukrainians and Caucasians. In any case, we know already that we cannot work with emigre parties as such, but that we can probably work with many of their personnel as individuals rather than as representatives of groups. Moreover, the Baltic states, like the satellites, and possibly some of the peripheral Asiatic regions, are relatively free from this problem,

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as most Great Russians do not regard them as a necessary part of a future Russia. However, the ultimate frictions between the many elements which might participate in a broad Revolution would necessitate a new sort of U.S. planning involving the possible use of our armed forces, but one of the items to be undertaken last as regards this last contingency.

Apart from our ignorance intelligence-wise, the greatest problem seems to be a security one. Here the greatest hazard appears to be our own publicity agents, for it is practically certain that the enemy already believes we are working along this line. Press leaks confirming their belief would be fatal, particularly those involving and compromising the conception of a D-day for general Revolution. It seems to me that there is only one secure way of dealing with this problem, which involves recognition of CIA as the leader and manager, or executive agent, for the project, subject to the usual controls as written in OPC's charter. The channels and methods for handling OPC's business seem reasonably secure, and the general conception can be sharply limited even within those channels. It would seem a fairly simple matter to arrange suitable cover against our own personnel for even the most major aspects of support planning.

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and logistics, for the only point requiring special protection would be the conception of and date of a D-day set by ourselves. All the rest flows from the accepted concept of covert support for an eventual overt war, or from preparations for a possible contingency over which we would have no control. The necessity for this latter sort of planning and preparation has already arisen, is well underway, and is at the same time widely known and securely held within the executive Departments.

This sort of effort is already intimately connected with the question of the scope and magnitude of the OPC effort, and it would appear that the present discussion also has a bearing thereon. I can see no real reason why the mechanisms which are already in existence, with the single exception of overall financing, are not adaptable to handling the problems that are involved regardless of scope and magnitude. As regards financing, the Defense Controller's proposal to seek legislation which would permit transfer of material to CIA without reimbursement would seem to offer a satisfactory solution, and one which is dependent upon scope and magnitude alone, rather than upon the specific aims which would be served.

The MacArthur affair, which balances war with China against war in Europe, shows what can happen to "broad national conceptions." The central conception which should be specially safeguarded is obviously not a subject for usual handling, by even the National Security Council, but the National Security Council does have a special mechanism for genuinely covert problems of importance, similar to the handling which has been applied in the case

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of NSC 10/2 itself. All of the other steps involved, regardless of magnitude, appear to be possible under the cover of planning and preparation for war or other assumed contingency. For example, it would appear possible to present the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the problem of determining what military dispositions should be made and what support could be given by the military establishment short of engaging U.S. forces in combat in case widespread rebellions should occur at an assumed future date in accordance with a fairly specific pattern. It is submitted that the central concept that such rebellions might occur would be surrounded with endless argument on the Joint Chiefs of Staff staff level, and that OPC planners rather than the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be the most suitable organization to determine the most practicable and advantageous patterns which they might take. Once the conception is given from outside or above to any planning staff, the arguments as to the validity of the conception, which are really rooted in our lack of intelligence, disappear, and the planning organizations can and will effectively discharge their normal function of planning. Although the variables in dealing with Revolutionary forces are inherently much more speculative than in dealing with force tabs for our own forces, we are already accumulating information and experience which is being concentrated in the Central Intelligence Agency. It is quite possible that if the support and fostering of Resistance movements is accepted on the scope now visualized by projects already before the Office of Policy Coordination, the central

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concept discussed in this paper may arise spontaneously from the indigenous peoples involved, and that the point of view of "if only this would take place" would adequately mask any conscious intent on our part to actually bring it about.

British or other international participation in the planning and preparation for Revolution constitute another problem, but one which certainly should not arise until we have progressed much further along this road by ourselves and have a clear idea of what might be sound and what might be faulty. Although the other nations must be taken into account, we would not appear to be fundamentally dependent on them beyond insuring that they are helpful rather than hindering.

There is another circumstance with which we may be confronted which seems to give a great deal of added weight and even reality to this centralized approach to reaching an ultimate solution for the cold war, and that is the situation that would result on Stalin's death, for which we should obviously be prepared. Although I believe that the Bolshevik hold over its peoples and lands is so weak that the Politburo will not permit the spontaneous development of any internal split, that belief is, as usual, based on inadequate intelligence; and the Communist milieu is so shot with suspicion and distrust that, given enough time and understanding, we ourselves might create the conditions for such a split and exploit it when the event occurs. Moreover, the relations between the satellites and the USSR at that time would appear to offer at least as good possibilities as those within the Soviet Union. Although Stalin's death is a separate project and is being considered separately, it carries with it perhaps even greater potentialities

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for general revolution than what we ourselves could manage unaided by such acts of God, and all of the problems of creation, organization, and support of undergrounds seem identical, lacking only a D-day whose date is known in advance. Few people will dispute that we should be fully prepared for Stalin's death, and to my mind our preparations should be the same as those discussed herein.

In the last analysis, whatever we do along these lines is fully justified as preparations for possible global war, and Stalin's death, like global war, may only substitute an unknown D-day for one that we plan and control ourselves. The United States has been very successful with the outcome of its planning when it has been able to control the critical date of releasing the operations involved, and it would be very comforting to at least have a plan to this end in the cold war instead of always being completely at the mercy of events. After all, all conceptions are initially released "for planning purposes only." Events alone release them for action, and all conceptions are always subject to replacement or revision in the light of events.

Finally, it must never be forgotten that Revolution and its aims are essentially products of the indigenous peoples involved, and that there are many limitations as well as capabilities, demanding the highest degree of judgment and skill, in the role which Americans can play in helping them to flourish. George Kennan's recent article in "Foreign Affairs," "America and the Russian Future," is pertinent in this respect.

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
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